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I.

INTRODUCTION

State agencies have grown exponentially in scope and reach; they
exercise significant power to affect the rights of individuals and business.
Agencies determine whether you receive a license to practice law, practice
medicine, or cut hair; they regulate and limit the use of your private property;
they dictate relationships between employees and employers, manufactures and
dealers, buyers and sellers; and they exercise many more powers. State
agencies wield immense power to control behavior and issue monetary
penalties in many areas of our personal and professional lives.1 Add to that
power the political nature of agencies, and the result is significant potential for
biased agency decisions. 2 These scenarios are bad enough for in-state
defendants; but what about the out-of-state defendant who believes he will be
the victim of additional bias based on their out-of-state status?
From the very beginning of the federal judiciary, the law has assured
the right of a diverse defendant to remove a suit from state court to federal
court, provided that the defendant meets certain criteria.4 In one form or
another, that right has remained intact for nearly 225 years.5 But how does that
removal right apply to administrative agencies? Can they emulate a court to a
point that subjects them to removal procedures? Today, states turn to
administrative agencies to adjudicate a wide variety of matters originally
handled by traditional state courts, including labor disputes, 6 motor vehicle and
I
See generally A.M. Gulas, The American Administrative State: The New Leviathan, 28
DUQ. L. REV. 489 (1989); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government And Regulatory Reform:
Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Purr. L. REV. 405 (1996).
Although most of the scholarly writing on this topic surrounds federal agencies, many of the
issues surrounding the expanding administrative state apply equally at the state level. See, e.g.,
Gulas, supra, at 489 ("Out of necessity, discussion will be limited to the federal sphere although
the questions raised are applicable to state administrative agencies as well.").
2
See infra Part IV.A for discussion on political influence and agency subject matter bias.
3
Whether or not a defendant is a diverse party for removal purposes is determined pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
4
See infra Part II for a discussion of the removal statutes and their criteria over time.
5
See infra Part II.
6
See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (adjudicating a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454
F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972) (same).
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transportation claims, 7 alcoholic beverages controls, 8 and a host of others.
Many of these agencies have taken on court-like attributes: engaging lawyers,
holding hearings, using pleadings, collecting evidence, taking depositions, and
more. 9 Additionally, many agencies utilize administrative law judges, who
adjudicate the dispute and issue orders. 10
Whether a state agency can qualify as a court for removal purposes has
spawned a significant amount of debate and a split amongst the federal courts.
The removal statute provides that a defendant may remove to federal court "any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction."" Some Circuit Courts of Appeals have
adopted a textualist approach, which holds that the plain meaning assigned to
the statute limits removal to regular courts only. 12 Other circuits, however, have
adopted a functionalist approach, which looks beyond the plain language of the
statute and evaluates whether the agency's procedures, functions, and powers
emulate a court so as to make them effectively indistinguishable. 1 3 These two
approaches are the foundation of the circuit split that belie any real standard. So
how should the courts decide?
This Note argues that the split of authority and confusion among
circuits should be resolved by uniformly adopting a modified functionalist
approach to determine whether a state agency is effectively acting as a state
court, because this approach better evaluates the changing administrative
landscape and preserves the right of diverse defendants to seek removal to a
federal forum.
At the core of the right of removal is the fear that an out-of-state
defendant might be subject to significant local prejudice if a plaintiff forces
them to defend their case in a state other than their own. 14 Thus, removal

7
See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994) (adjudicating an
early termination of a dealership agreement controlled by state regulations); Southaven
Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 128 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
(adjudicating a dispute between a motorcycle dealer and manufacturer).
8
See Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 224 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2000)
(adjudicating a dispute between a liquor distributor and a manufacturer that wanted to obtain
more distributors); R.J. Distributing Co. v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc., No. 99 C 3836, 1999 WL
571009 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1999) (same).
9
See infra Part IV.D.
10 See infra Part IV for a discussion of agency's administrative law judges.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Although this is the current removal statute,
previous removal statutes have contained essentially the same requirement. See infra Part II for a
discussion of the statute's history.
12
See infra Part III.C.
13 See infra Parts IlIl.A, III.B.
14
See Scott R. Haiber, Removing The Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 614
(2004).
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insures a defendant's right to have the case heard in a federal forum, in front of
a presumptively neutral federal judge. The theory holds that a defendant should
not be subjected to the risk of having his rights violated by a biased adjudicator.
As this Note shows, these risks exist for out-of-state defendants when agencies
act as de facto courts. As a result, actions under state administrative agencies
that present substantially similar risks should be subject to the same right of
removal.
Part II of this Note reviews the right of removal, the federal judicial
structure, and the authority to exercise diversity jurisdiction. It then examines
the underlying intent and purpose of removal. Next, this Part outlines the
statutory authority for the removal statute from its inception in 1789 all the way
through its current form in 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Finally, this Part provides a brief
overview of the removal of state administrative action to federal court as it
currently exists.
Part III provides a detailed description of the various approaches for
removal of agency actions. It explains the functionalist approach and its rise to
dominance, functionalist sub-approaches, and the countervailing textualist
approach. This Part closes with a discussion of the current circuit split that
belies any real standard and leads to disparate outcomes.
Part IV analyzes how state agencies have grown into an administrative
"state" and how the expanding scope and power of these agencies makes them
similar to state courts. This Part goes on to discuss how the expansion of
administrative adjudication falls short of its claimed benefits. Next, Part IV
looks at the abandonment of the separation of powers doctrine in the context of
state agencies and the attendant risks that reinforce the necessity of the removal
right. Lastly, Part IV lays out the factors that courts weigh in determining an
agency's resemblance to a court, including some drawbacks and benefits.
Part V advocates for the functionalist approach while recommending
an additional factor. Next, this Part shows the necessity of the removal right by
comparing how the potential agency bias presents the same risks as state court
bias. Finally, Part V explains why two concerns expressed by opponents of
agency removal do not justify overriding the removal right.
II. BACKGROUND

In order to understand why the right of removal to a federal court
should extend to state agency actions, we must have an understanding of the
right of removal generally. First, this Part looks at the underlying reasoning and
intent of the right of removal and why the founders felt it was necessary. Then,
this part provides a historical rundown of the statutory authority for removal
over time, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789 and culminating with the
current removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Finally, this Part looks at the
approaches courts take when determining whether it is proper to allow removal
of a state agency action to federal court under the current removal statute.
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A.

The Right ofRemoval and Its Early Statutory Authority

The United States Constitution establishes one Supreme Court and
authorizes Congress to "ordain and establish" inferior federal courts as it deems
necessary. 15 Congress, under the Judiciary Act of 1789 ("the 1789 Act"),
established two additional levels of federal courts below the Supreme Court:
federal district courts and federal circuit courts. 16 The federal district court
level consisted of a district court in each state, presided over by one federal
judge, "which heard admiralty and maritime cases and some other minor
cases."' 17 The federal circuit court level "served as the principal8 trial courts in
the federal system and exercised limited appellate jurisdiction."'
The federal courts' power to hear cases comes only from either the
express authority of the Constitution or the express authorization of Congress. 19
Consequently, if neither Congress nor the Constitution extended jurisdiction,
there is no legal authority for a federal court to hear a suit; 20 the plaintiffs only
recourse is to file in state court. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction was limited to specific suits: "In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."'" Of
particular concern for this Note is the grant of original jurisdiction to cases
"between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States"-also known as diversity jurisdiction.2 2
When Congress passed the 1789 Act, it extended jurisdictional limits to
the newly established lower federal courts.23 Among those jurisdictional limits

§ 1.

15

U.S. CONST. art. III,

16

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also The JudiciaryAct of 1789: "An

Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States. ", FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/landmark_02.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
17
See The JudiciaryAct of 1789: "An Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United
States. ", FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_02.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2014).
18

Id.

19

See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). "'Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,'
possessing 'only that power authorized by Constitution and statute."' Id.
20

13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3522, at 100 (3d

ed. 1998). The parties cannot waive jurisdiction, and federal courts must look sua sponte at
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit. Id. at 122.
21

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

22

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This Constitution provision authorizes the original grant of

diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts.
23

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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was original jurisdiction in suits between citizens of different states.24
Additionally, Section 12 of the 1789 Act explicitly provided for removal from
state court to federal court.25 In summary, the 1789 Act provides that a
defendant may remove a civil action instituted in state court, which has more
than $500 at controversy, and for which the court extended original jurisdiction
to the federal court in Section 11-most particularly for our purposes--cases in
which there was diversity of citizenship.26 History shows that Congress had
specific reasons for providing a defendant the right to remove.
From its inception, the removal statute's well-accepted primary
27
purpose was to protect out-of-state defendants against potential bias in court.
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this necessity in Bank of U.S. v.
Deveaux.28 In Deveaux, the Chief Justice recognized that, regardless of a belief
in impartiality of the state courts, the Constitution, nevertheless, implicitly
showed its concern for bias by establishing a federal forum for diverse
parties. 29 As a result, an important objective of the early judiciary was to have
federal courts "in each state, presumed to be free from local influence; and to
which all who were non-residents or aliens might resort for legal redress. 3 °
Additionally, a review of the framers' 3 ' concerns on the subject
bolsters the Court's findings. James Madison, the "father of our
Constitution, 3 2 showed concern that "a strong prejudice may arise, in some

24

Id. § 11 ("That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts

of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where ... the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state.").
25

Id. § 12.

26

See Haiber, supra note 14, at 617-18.
See Gordon v. Longest, 41 U.S. 97, 104 (1842); Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87

27

(1809), overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston R.R. Co. v.
Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
9 U.S. 61 (1809), overruledin part on other grounds by Letson, 43 U.S. 497.
28
Id. at 87. Marshall found:
29
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it
is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on
this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and
apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the
decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of
different states.
Id.
30
31

Gordon, 41 U.S. at 104.
The term "framers" refers to the original drafters and debaters of the United States

Constitution.
32
See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution,
80 TEX. L. REv. 703, 720 (2002) (describing Madison as the "Father of our Constitution" and
explaining how Madison received that moniker).
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states, against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them. 33
Alexander Hamilton echoed Madison's concern, adding that suits "between
citizens of different states should be assigned to a federal court 'likely to be
impartial between the different states and their citizens, and which, owing its
official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious
to the principles on which it is founded.' ' 34 It is this concern for impartial
treatment towards all parties that influenced the evolution of removal's
statutory regulation.
The language of Section 12 of the 1789 Act limited the removal
jurisdiction to a specific group of suits, including removal of any suit
"commenced in state court" for which the amount in controversy was greater
than $500, provided that the suit involved either an alien defendant or an instate plaintiff suing an out-of-state defendant.3 5 Section 12 contained only one
additional type of suit for which Congress authorized removal: land disputes
involving conflicting claims of state land grants.36 Thus, the removal statute
contained in the First Judiciary Act was primarily concerned with diverse
parties and did not include federal question jurisdiction-a common basis of
jurisdiction in the modem federal court system.37
The original removal authority granted under the 1789 Act,
notwithstanding its brief expansion and retraction from 1801 to 1802, remained
intact for almost 85 years with a few limited statutory exceptions.38 However,
in 1875, Congress significantly changed the jurisdictional authority when it

3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
33

PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 533 (2d ed. 1836).
34 Haiber, supra note 14, at 614 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)).
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36

Id.

Jed Glickstein, After Midnight: The CircuitJudges and the Repeal of the JudiciaryAct of
1801, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 543, at 543, 546 (2012). Congress briefly granted federal question
jurisdiction to the lower federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1801. Id. at 546. However,
Congress repealed the 1801 Act on April 29, 1802, and partially replaced it with the Judiciary
Act of 1802. An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States (The Judiciary Act of
1802), ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (1802). While the 1802 Act did reinstitute some portions of the 1801
Act, federal question jurisdiction was not included. Id. For a thorough discussion of the Judiciary
Act of 1801, see Erwin C. Surrency, The JudiciaryAct of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 53 (1958).
38
Congress did on occasion provide for statutory removal in legislation aimed at forwarding
certain policy objectives, including customs enforcement during the War of 1812, "collection of
revenue following South Carolina's attempt to nullify tariff laws," and to "protect civil and
political liberties" in post-Civil War confederate states (primarily to protect the rights of the
newly freed slaves and Union soldiers). See The Jurisdictionand Removal Act of 1875: "An Act
To Determine the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, and To Regulate the
Removal of Causes from State Courts, and for Other Purposes.", FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark-Il.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
37
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passed the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875 ("the 1875 Act").39 The 1875
Act significantly addressed the concerns that state court actions were

interfering with interstate commerce by broadening the original and removal
jurisdiction that federal courts could exercise. 40 First, the 1875 Act allowed for
"federal question" jurisdiction. 4' Federal question jurisdiction allows a party to
remove to federal court any suit in which they could show that the Constitution,
a duly enacted federal law, or a ratified treaty, to which the United States was a

signatory, was at the crux of the dispute.4 2 Additionally, any suit in which the
United States was "plaintiff or petitioner," would provide a basis for removal to
federal court.43

Second, the 1875 Act solidified and expanded removal jurisdiction for
diverse parties. The Act retained removal for "controvers[ies] between citizens
of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States," defendant44

aliens, and defendants that were citizens of a different state than the plaintiff.
However, the significant expansion afforded by this section was not only the
continuation of allowing defendants to remove to federal court, but also the
novel allowance that plaintiffs could remove to federal court.45 Regardless of
which litigant removed the suit, or how they removed it, the suit still needed to

39
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). The full title of the Act is "The
Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875: 'An Act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of
the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other
purposes."' Id. Interestingly, those that supported expanding the right of removal under the 1875
Act did so with the belief that it would help protect the constitutional rights of freed slaves and

southern Unionists. See Landmark JudicialLegislation - The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of

1875, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_l 1.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2014). The belief was that freed slaves and those that sided with the Union during the
Civil War were at significant risk of encountering state judicial systems in formerly confederate
states that were hostile. Id. However, by the time that Congress actually debated the Act, most
legislators were more concerned with rapidly expanding interstate commerce-an area that state
courts often stifled. Id.
40
Presumably, the idea behind the expansion of removal was that operators in commerce,
who state court decisions were restraining, would have the ability to remove to a federal forum
where they would be more likely to get a ruling favoring their interstate commerce concerns as
opposed to narrow or biased state interests.
41
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, (1875), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark11_txt.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
42
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) ("The [federal question] doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court
ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial
questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of
uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues."); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 818 (1986).
43
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
4
Id.
45

Id.
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meet the $500 minimum amount in controversy threshold.46 Lastly, the Act of

1875 retained the specific wording that required any action removed to federal
court be a civil suit that was "brought in any State court. 4 7 In sum, the 1875

Act allowed greater access to federal courts by expanding both their original
and removal jurisdictions. This expansion attracted "new types of litigation that
swelled the caseload of the federal courts. 4 8
The sizable increase in the federal trial and appellate court dockets
generated by the 1875 Act's jurisdictional expansion proved to be unworkable
and prompted Congress to act.49 A mere 12 years later, Congress reworked the
removal statute by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1887 ("the 1887 Act").50 The

1887 Act reversed the expansion of removal jurisdiction in several ways. First,
the 1887 Act revoked the availability of removal for plaintiffs, explicitly
limiting the possibility of removal to defendants.5 Second, the 1887 Act raised

the minimum amount in controversy threshold to $2,000.52 Third, the 1887 Act
explicitly required that, in order for removal to be proper, a state action may
only be removed to a federal court if that federal court would have had original
jurisdiction had the defendant filed the suit there originally. 53
In reviewing the history of the 1887 Act, it appears evident that
Congress intended to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear suits
based on removal, largely in response to the swelling court dockets.14 This

47

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

48

The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875: "An Act To Determine the Jurisdiction of the

46

Circuit Courts of the United States, and To Regulate the Removal of Causesfrom State Courts,
and for Other Purposes.", FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/

landmark_l 1.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
See Erica B. Haggard, Removal to Federal Courts from State Administrative Agencies:
Reevaluatingthe Functional Test, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2009) (citing Michael G.
Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IowA L. REv. 717, 738-42, 744
49

(1986) (discussing the background of the 1887 Act and the almost immediate attempts to amend
the 1875 Act after it passed)).
50
Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (1887). The full title of the Act is: "An act to
determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States and to regulate the removal of
causes from State courts, and for other purposes and to further regulate the jurisdiction of circuit
courts of the United States, and for other purposes."
51
52

53

Id. § l.
Id.
Id. §2.

54
See Haggard, supra note 49, at 1836-37 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313
U.S. 100, 108 (1941)). "The Judiciary Act of 1887 substantially curtailed removal in response to
the swelling of federal court dockets, at both the trial and appellate levels, following the Judiciary
Act of 1875." Id. (citing Michael G. Collins, The UnhappyHistory of FederalQuestion Removal,
71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 720 (1986)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 117

tighter gateway remained virtually unscathed for nearly six decades55 until
Congress promulgated the current removal statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.56
The next Section describes how § 1441 changed the landscape of removal
proceedings.
The removal statute, established in the very beginning of our nations'
judiciary, went through a period of expansion followed by an abrupt restriction;
however, the core concept-the right of removal for a diverse defendantremained intact throughout. That core tenet continues on in our modem
removal statute.
B. The CurrentRemoval Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1441
The Judicial Code of 1948 Act ("the 1948 Act") 57 made some changes
to the authority and process of removal, which have varying degrees of
relevance to this Note. The first significant change relates to the timing of
removal. Prior to the 1948 Act, a defendant could properly remove at any time
prior to the final due date of any responsive pleading. 8 Because jurisdictional
requirements for the timing of responsive pleadings varied significantly across
jurisdictions, Congress, in an effort to provide a more consistent removal
standard, "enacted language that required service 'within twenty days after
59
commencement of the action or service of process, whichever is later.'
Although this does not bear heavily on the removal authority or procedure, it is
an example of Congress' intent to make the removal statute more fair and
standardized for all defendants seeking a federal forum.60
Again, evidence exists that Congress' "desire for removal practice to
remain fair, uniform, and efficient" was at the heart of the 1948 Act and its
subsequent amendments. 61 For example, the committee notes to the 1988
amendment discuss the unfair gamesmanship of last minute additions of "Doe"
55 With the exception of some minor organizational changes by Congress in 1911. See 28
U.S.C. § 71 (1940); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231 § 28, 36 stat. 1094; see also Haiber, supra note
14, at 626.
56
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1938. It was not until

1948 that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 was codified.
57 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 89, § 1441, 62 Stat. 937.
58
28 U.S.C. § 72 (1940) (consolidated in 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
59 Haiber, supra note 14, at 633.
60 Id. (citing Committee Note to 1948 Enactment of Removal Statutes, H.R. Rep. No. 80308, at A135 (1948) (stating that revised § 1446 "will give adequate time and operate uniformly
throughout the Federal jurisdiction")).
61
See Haiber, supra note 14, at 634. Haiber discusses at length the evidence of congressional
intent to provide for a "fair, uniform, and efficient" application of the removal statutes, rather
than the belief that congress somehow intended to limit access to the federal court forum through
procedural barriers; barriers that Haiber claims courts placed there over time through judicial fiat.
Id. at 632-34.
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defendants.62 This tactic could potentially destroy diversity of the parties or toll
the statute of limitations, which could lead to difficulties in determining the
timing of removal.63
Ultimately, the current removal statute follows the underlying premises
of the original removal statute, as well as the 1887 Act; it affirms a defendant's
right64 to remove a suit initiated in state court to a federal district court, so long
as the federal court could have exercised original jurisdiction had the suit been
initiated there.6 5 The original jurisdiction requirement retained the federal
court's diversity and federal question jurisdictions for the same reasons that
they were originally included-protection of out-of-state defendants'66 rights and
law.
the prudence of having federal courts decide matters of federal
C. Removal of State Agency Actions

Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1441, nor any of its predecessor statutes, contains
any language expressly addressing the right of a defendant to remove a state
agency's administrative action to federal court. Traditionally, the only course of
action for a defendant was to fight it out with the state agency and then appeal
any agency ruling to the state courts.67 Any such defendant is subject to that
agency's procedural system and their decision-often the ruling of an
administrative law judge ("AL").68 Prior to reaching a federal court, that
defendant might have to exhaust all administrative remedies, appeal the
agency's final ruling to a state trial court, continue appealing until reaching the
62

See 16

MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 107App.08[2] (referring to committee notes

to the 1988 amendment of § 1441(a)). A "Doe" defendant, often called "John Doe" or "Jane
Doe" is a pseudonym for an unknown, and thus unnamed, defendant used to secure a claim
procedurally. See Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure To
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. Plrr. L. REV. 883, 885-86 (1996) ("John Doe preserves the
plaintiff's claim by standing in for an unknown defendant while the plaintiff tries to determine
the defendant's actual name.").
63
See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 107App.08[2] (referring to committee notes
to the 1988 amendment of§ 1441(a)).
64
See supra Part II.A discussing the right of removal; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. 304, 348-49 (1816) (inferring that choice of federal forum was not plaintiff's alone and that
the power to remove, although not expressed in the Constitution, was "necessary and proper to
carry into effect some express power" granted to defendant's "who might be entitled to try their
rights, or assert their priviliges [sic], before the same [federal] forum").
The Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552 (1887); see also Removal to Federal
65
Courts from State Administrative Agencies, 69 YALE L.J. 615, 615, n.4 (1960) [hereinafter
Removal to FederalCourts].
See supra Part II.A.
66
67

See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 1767 (3d ed. 1988).
See 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
68
PROCEDURE JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8199, at 281 (1st ed. 2013).
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state's court of last resort, and finally, apply for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. 69 Thus, without the right of removal, the first opportunity for a

defendant to have a non-state court hear their case could be after years of
litigation and significant expense-not to mention that it would still rely on the
one to two percent chance of the Supreme Court actually granting certiorari.7 °

This long and arduous path is both time and cost prohibitive, effectively
preventing a defendant from any practical ability to have their case heard in a
federal forum solely because the action is in front of a state agency rather than

a state court.
The express language of the removal statutes provides that only suits

brought in "state court" are eligible for removal. However, over time, courts
have looked at the meaning and intent of the statutes in order to interpret a
meaning of "state court" that would comport with the underlying purposes of
removal.7 2 Legal scholars have primarily employed two approaches to interpret

what constitutes a state court for purposes of removal.
First is the "textualist approach," sometimes called the "formalist
approach," which uses only the plain language meaning of "state court," and
consequently holds that only a cause of action brought in an actual state court,
vested with "judicial power," can qualify for removal purposes.

73

One of the

appeals of the textualist approach is its binary simplicity-if the state

69

See BATOR ET AL., supra note 67. Under some circumstances, the path may be different, for

example, some actions can be brought either in a federal circuit court or in the agency depending
upon the plaintiff's choice. See Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp.
2d 1280, 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2002). Also, it is important to note that, depending on the statutory
structure, some agency actions are appealable directly to state court, at which point the case
could arguably be removed to federal court-assuming that the other removal requirements are
met.
70
See
Supreme
Court
Procedures-Writs
of
Certiorari, USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/supreme-court/supreme-courtprocedures.aspx ("In fact, the Court accepts 100[-]150 of the more than 7,000 cases that it is
asked to review each year.").
71 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) ("action brought in a State court"); Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137,
§ 2, 18 Stat. 470, (1875), available at http://www.tc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark._
11_txt.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) ("brought in any state court"); Judicial Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=
12&page---transcript (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) ("any action commenced in state court").
72 See Haggard, supra note 49, at 1832.
73 See id. at 1872 (citing Upshur Cnty. v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 471-72 (1890) and Sun Buick,
Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1264, 1263 (3d Cir. 1994), as examples of courts analyzing
under a textualist approach); Emily M. Rector, Removingfrom State Administrative Agencies, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2269, 2273 (2009) (citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Or. Bureau of
Labor and Indus. v. U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002), in which, the court
looks solely to the plain text of the removal statute, thus adopting the textualist or formalist
approach).
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designates it as a court, removal is proper; if the state does not designate it as a
court, removal is improper.74
Second is the "functionalist approach," which arguably began in 1959,
and has become the courts' predominant approach for agency removal
analysis. 5 Under the functionalist approach, courts have established a test that
"evaluate[s] the functions, powers, and procedures of the state tribunal and
consider[s] those factors along with the respective state and federal interests in
the subject matter and in the provision of a forum."7 6 The core objective of the
functionalist test is to evaluate the "courtness", 77 of an administrative agency;
thus, the more closely an agency and its proceedings resemble a state court and
its proceedings, the more likely that removal will be proper.
In summary, the likelihood that a federal court will allow state agency
removal will depend on which of the two main approaches that federal court
has adopted. Additionally, if the federal court follows the functionalist
approach, the likelihood of removal will then depend on how closely the
agency proceedings emulate a state court. Finally, the criteria and factors used
by courts in evaluating the similarity between agencies, state courts, and their

corresponding procedures exacerbate the uncertainty of removal actions. The
next Part of this Note discusses the two approaches in more detail, including
the various factors used in the functionalist test. Suffice to say, the legitimacy
of removal of state agency actions to federal court is an unsettled question in
need of some stability. Inconsistent judgments across federal circuit courts
underscore this need. Ultimately, we need clarity and consistency to secure the
rights of diverse defendants to remove actions from state agencies to federal
court when those state agencies operate as defacto courts.

See Rector, supranote 73, at 2272-75 (2009).
75 See supra Part III.A-III.B; Darren W. Ford, Comment, Getting Past Function and
Focusing on Results: When Should a Proceeding Before a State Administrative Agency Be
Removable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(A)?, 78 U. CrN. L. REv. 321, 327-28 (2009). Ford discusses
the decision in Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't, 170 F. Supp.
945 (E.D. Wis. 1959). The 1959 date for the beginning of the functionalist approach is arguable
because, as Ford notes, the Tool & Die court cited two earlier cases, Upshur Cnty. v. Rich, 135
U.S. 467 (1890) and Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). Unfortunately, the
Tool & Die court did not provide much analysis as to how they utilized those two earlier cases;
see also Haggard, supra note 49, at 1839-40. It should be noted that in Upshur Cnty. the Court
held that a body titled the "circuit court" was not a court for the purposes of removal; however,
the Upshur Cnty. Court found that the "circuit court" in that case was merely a tax assessing
board, whose functions were "administrative, and not judicial in the ordinary sense of that term,
though often involving the exercise of quasi judicial functions." Upshur Cty., 135 U.S. at 471.
76
Floeter v. C.W. Transport, Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
74

77 See Rector, supra note 73, at 2286. "This part of the test is designed to measure the
'courtness' of a particular administrative body; if the body sufficiently resembles a court, it is
considered a 'State court' within the meaning of the removal statute." Id.
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Ill. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND CURRENT APPROACHES
Federal courts are split over which framework should be applied to
determine removability of agency actions. On one side of the split is the
"functionalist approach," which looks at "the procedures and functions of the
78
State tribunal rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated.,
Furthermore, amongst those courts that favor the functionalist approach,
several sub-approaches have emerged.79 On the other side of the split is the
"textualist approach," which maintains that only the plain language of the
statute should control. 80 Textualists hold that the plain language of § 1441
allows removal only from a "state court," thus, an action in any tribunal that is
not a court is not removable. 81 This Part explains the various approaches and
sub-approaches, including the factors that the courts consider in determining
whether a state agency is, in effect, a state court for removal purposes. Section
A begins with the historical growth and dominance of the functionalist
approach. Section B follows with a description of the major sub-approaches
that have developed. Section C explores the growth of a new textualist
approach and its threat to functionalist dominance. Lastly, Section D outlines
the current circuit split that belies any real standard.
A.

The FunctionalistApproach EstablishesIts Dominance

Some courts have long recognized the changing nature of state
82
administrative agencies and their growing resemblance to state courts.
Dissatisfied with the all-or-nothing nature of a textualist approach and its
blanket application to all agencies, they looked beyond the plain meaning of the
removal statute's language: They formulated a functionalist approach. Courts
began to "evaluate the functions, powers, and procedures of the state

78

Tool & Die, 170 F. Supp. at 950.

79

See Jason Johnston, Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., ex rel Richardson v. U.S. West

Communications: Can Administrative Agencies be Considered Courts for the Purposes of

Removal?, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 449, 449 (2002). Johnson breaks out three sub-categories of
functionalist analysis: (1) "jurisdictions that apply the functional test but only look at the way the
agency will handle the current dispute," (2) "jurisdictions that apply the functional test but look
at the overall purpose of the agency," and (3) "jurisdictions that apply the functional test but put
more emphasis on the state and federal interest than on the agency's function." Id. at 451.
80
See Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 288
F.3d 414, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2002).

81 Id. "We therefore agree with the Third Circuit that the language of § 1441(a) 'should be
dispositive.' Thus, our analysis of the statutory language need go no further: 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
authorizes removal only from a 'state court,' which necessarily implies that the entity in question
must be a court." Id. at 418 (emphasis in original).
82

See supra Part IV.
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tribunal. 83 These courts recognized that, regardless of the name assigned to a
tribunal by the state, they were sometimes a functional equivalent to a state
court for removal purposes.84
The first explicit recognition of the functionalist approach came from
the Eastern District of Michigan's decision in Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78
v. General Electric Co. X-Ray Department.85 However, the Tool & Die court
relied significantly on two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions,
Upshur County v. Rich 86 and Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 87 which
arguably established a functionalist approach as early as 1890.88 To place the
Tool & Die holding in proper perspective, a review of those two cases is in
order.
In Upshur County, the Court reviewed a claim by property owners that
the "county court of Upshur county" improperly assessed their land. 89 The
West Virginia Constitution established such county courts and ordained them
with a variety of powers and responsibilities. 90 Additionally, article 8, section
24 of the state constitution contained a residual clause that allowed the county
courts to "exercise such other powers and perform such other duties, not of a
judicial nature, as may be prescribed by law." 9' The legislature subsequently
enacted a law that allowed property owners to appeal property tax assessments

83

Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Volkswagen

de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1972). In discussing the
value of a textualist approach the court was "unconvinced that, as to the Board's specific
function... the institutional label is dispositive." Id. at 43. Further, the First Circuit cited the
Tool & Die reasoning and adopted the functionalist approach, finding that
[s]uch an approach is not cavalierly undertaken, but must focus on a number
of relevant factors, including the Board's procedures and enforcement
powers, the locus of traditional jurisdiction over breaches of contract, and the
respective state and federal interests in the subject matter and in the provision
of a forum.
Id. at 44.
84
See Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1102 ("We hold that the title given a state tribunal is not
determinative."); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc., 454 F.2d at 44 (holding that by adopting a
functionalist approach, "[c]oncentrating on such factors seems to us far more satisfactory than to
be content with a Steinian rendering of 'a board is a board is a board."').
85 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959). See Ford, supra note 75, at 322-23 (stating that the
administrative removal "debate most likely began" with the Tool & Die decision and that the
functionalist approach became the predominant approach).
86
135 U.S. 467 (1890).
87
211 U.S. 210 (1908).
88
See generally Upshur Cnty., 135 U.S. 467 (1890). But see supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
89
Upshur Cnty., 135 U.S. at 467.
90
W. VA. CONST. art 8, §§ 22-24 (1872); Id. at 471-72.
91

Upshur Cnty., 135 U.S. at 472 (quoting W. VA. CONST. art 8, § 24 (1872)).
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to those county courts; 9 2 the Upshur County property owners filed their appeal
based on this law. 93 The same day that the owners filed their appeal to the
county court, they94 also filed a petition for removal to the federal district court
of West Virginia.
The district court analyzed the relevant statutory power granted to the
county court under the state constitution and the procedures it employed in
furtherance of that power. 95 First, the court established that the valuation of
land and assessment of taxes were administrative functions.96 Second, the court
concurred with the West Virginia Supreme Court that an appeal of tax
assessments, whether to "a court or other body.., are no more judicial acts
than the acts of the officer or authority making the original assessment., 97 The
court recognized that a suit questioning the validity or constitutionality of a tax
assessment could become the subject of an actual judicial review; 98 however, in
this case, the Upshur County court was merely an administrative extension of
the tax assessor. 99 Based on this finding, the Supreme Court held that despite
possessing the label of county "court," the Upshur County court did not qualify
as a court for removal purposes. 00
The Prentis Court reviewed the actions of the Virginia State
Corporation Commission, which the Virginia Constitution authorized to
"supervise, regulate, and control public service corporations."10 1 The
Commission, as one of its duties, set railway rates for passenger travel within

92

Id. ("Any person feeling himself aggrieved by the assessment of his real estate, made under

the provisions of this act, may, within one year after the filing of a copy of such assessment with
the clerk of the county court, apply, by himself or his agent, to the said court for redress.").
93

Id.

94

Id. at 468.

95

Id. at 471-73.

96

Id. at 472.

97 Id. at 473 (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinatti & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Public Works, 28
W. Va. 264, 270 (1886)).

98

Id. at 477. For example, the Upshur Cnty. court stated:

[The] legality and constitutionality of taxes and assessments may be
subjected to judicial examination in various ways,-by an action against the
collecting officer, by a bill for injunction, by certiorari, and by other modes
of proceeding. Then, indeed, a suit arises which may come within the
cognizance of the federal courts, either by removal thereto, or by writ of error
from this court, according to the nature and circumstances of the case.
Id. at 473.
99 Id. at 472-73, 477.
100 Id. at 477. This is somewhat opposite of the majority of claims, in which a court is asked to
determine if an agency that is not labeled as a court still functions as a court. This distinction is
one which textualists use to make their claims that the Upshur Cnty. decision did not establish a
functionalist approach. See supra Part III.C.
101 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 224 (1908).
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the state; several railroad companies objected to the new rate increases and
filed suit. 0 2 Although the Prentis Court acknowledged that the Commission
was "clothed with legislative, judicial, and executive powers," it separated the
ratemaking function-the subject of the suit-from the Commission's other
functions. ° 3 The Court held that the question of whether a proceeding was
judicial, thus qualifying as a claim in a state court, "depends not upon the
character of the body, but upon the character of the proceedings."' 10 4 Because
the Court found the ratemaking procedure to be legislative in nature, it could
not be considered a judicial proceeding "no matter what may be
the general or
05
place."'
take
may
they
which
in
body
the
of
character
dominant
With the Upshur County and Prentis rulings as background, we once
again look at the case that began the predominance of the functionalist
approach-Tool & Die.10 6 In 1958, two labor unions filed complaints with the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board ("WERB"), alleging that an employer
was engaging in unfair labor practices according to Wisconsin state law and
had violated their collective bargaining agreement. 0 7 The Tool & Die court,
relying solely on the Upshur County and Prentis rulings, 108 opined decisively:
[I]t is clear that the Supreme Court of the United States has
adopted a functional rather than a literal test. Thus the question
of whether a proceeding may be regarded as an action in a
State court within the meaning of the statute is determined by
reference to the procedures and functions of the State tribunal
rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated. 109
As with the Upshur County and Prentis Courts, the court here looked at
the proceeding that was the subject of the suit and analyzed the procedures and
functions of the WERB. 1 0

102

Id. at 225.

103

Id. at 226.

104

Id.

105

Id. This is the basis of a "dispute-specific" approach, in which the court determines the

whether the particular agency proceeding is conducting similarly to a court proceeding. See supra
Parts II1.B. 1-III.B.2 for discussion on the dispute specific approach and its counter, the "global"
approach.
106
Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D.
Wis. 1959).
107

See id. at 947.

108

Although the Tool & Die court failed to analyze those rulings, or detail the reasoning with

which they agreed, it seems clear that the court fully adopted those decisions based on their
matter-of-fact acceptance of them and their statement that "it is clear" the functionalist approach
is the approach accepted by the Supreme Court. Id. at 950.
109

Id.

110

Id.
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The court started by analyzing the statutory language that allowed the
WERB to hear these cases and found that language to "reveal[] its judicial
character.""' Contained within the authorizing statute was the power for the
WERB to accept complaints, receive answers, set hearing dates, issue
subpoenas under threat of contempt, allow for depositions, prepare and keep a
record subject to the prevailing court rules of evidence, make findings, and
enter orders compelling one of the parties to act. 112 The court did recognize that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously ruled that the WERB was not
"exercising judicial functions when it makes a determination"; however, it gave
that ruling virtually no weight in its determination. 113
The court did take significant notice of the fact that the "judicial
inquiry" was bifurcated between the WERB, which investigates and issues
orders, and the court, which enforces those orders. 114 The court recognized that
the ability to enforce its own orders was "sinificant if not decisive on the
question as to whether a tribunal is a court." ' 15 Despite this recognition, the
court found that the separation "presents no obstacle to removal since the
actions have the same essentials as original suits permissible in Federal district
courts or in State trial courts."'" 16 In other words, if a Board's actions and
powers significantly resemble the actions and powers of a court, the mere
separation of the enforcement ability does not defeat its recognition as a court
for removal purposes.
One significant concept to come out of Tool & Die is the concept that
the right of removal cannot necessarily be defeated simply because a state
decides to "divide[] the judicial function." ' 1 7 Rather, courts should look at
whether the agency is performing part of the judicial function and, if so, how
much of the function.' 8 In Tool & Die, the court recognized that the judicial
function was composed of all the functions statutorily given to the Board, plus
the enforcement powers that the court maintained. Although Wisconsin had the
right to "provide the procedure by which, and the forum before which" certain
types of suits may be brought, the "right of removal cannot be affected by the
creation by the State of a special remedy as an alternative to a traditional court
action.""19

III

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id. (citing Dairy Emps. Indep. Union at Blochowiak Dairy v. Wis. Emp't Relations Bd., 55

N.W.2d 3 (Wis. 1952)).
114 Id. at 951.
1"
116

117
118
119

Id. at 950.
Id. at951.
Id. at 950.
Id. (discussing the various factors that weighed in favor of finding an agency to be a court).
Id.
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The core of the functionalist approach espoused in Tool & Die would
provide the basis for the majority of agency removal decisions over the next
fifty-four years. 20 However, courts would continue to refine the functionalist
approach in an attempt to provide a fairer, more practical approach to
determine whether a state agency was, in effect, a court for removal purposes.
B. FunctionalistSub-Approaches Develop
Since the Tool & Die ruling solidified a functionalist approach, several
other courts have attempted to fine-tune the approach. These other courts'
reasoning breaks out into three sub-approaches: (1) the "dispute-specific"
approach, which looks at how the agency handles that particular type of dispute
in question; (2) the "global" approach, which evaluates the overall general
purpose and functions of the agency; and (3) the "federal-state interest"
approach, which weighs the two interests against one another to determine
which is superior. The sub-approaches utilize the core functionalist tenet-that
the functions and procedures of an agency might make it a court for removal
purposes.
1. The "Dispute-Specific" Approach
The dispute-specific approach finds its origins in the First Circuit
decision Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations
Board.121 In Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, the court declined to look at the "full
breadth of [the Board's] jurisdiction" or the "institutional status of the Board as
to any of its other functions, jurisdictions, or procedures."'' 22 The court was
"unconvinced that, as to the Board's specific function of applying federal
substantive law to § 301 cases, the institutional label is dispositive. ' ' 2 Instead,
the court looked very narrowly "at the reconciling [of] the removal statute with
the federal law relating to § 301 and its implementation in both state and
federal forums."' 124 Although the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board
administered many types of labor related claims, this particular dispute
implicated a specific section of the federal code regarding the 'violation of

120
121

See Ford, supra note 75, at 322-23.
454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972). The court declined to take a textualist approach; instead, they

opted for a functionalist approach that looked at the specific function in dispute: "But we are
unconvinced that, as to the Board's specific function of applying federal substantive law to § 301
cases; the institutional label is dispositive." Id. at 43.
122
Id. at 44.
123
Id. at 43.
124
Id. at 44. "Section 301" refers to § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act. National
Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 301, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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collective bargaining agreements. 125 The court looked only at how the Board
handled those specific disputes-not the totality of functions and procedures
employed across the entire27agency. 126 Several other courts have adopted this
dispute-specific approach. 1
2.

The "Global" Approach

In contrast to the dispute-specific approach, the global approach looks
not at the procedures and functions surrounding the specific contested dispute,
17128
but instead it takes a holistic "look at the overall purpose of the agency ....
The Third Circuit applied the global approach in Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars
USA, Inc., 2 9 when it endeavored to determine whether the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles ("PVB") was equivalent to a court for removal purposes. The Third
Circuit did not expressly accept the functionalist approach. 130 However, it
accepted the Floeter and Volkswagen rulings and then proceeded to perform a
functionalist analysis to distinguish the PVB from agencies such as those in
Floeter and Volkswagen.1 31 The functionalist analysis that the court performed
125

Id. at 40.

126

Id. at 44.

127

See Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 224 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir.

2000) (citing Floeter's recognition that a fact-specific analysis of the particular dispute was
required and finding that their case was "one of those other cases in which the weighing of the
competing interests results in a different conclusion not sanctioning removal to federal court");
Floeter v. C.W. Trans., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the state agency
may or may not be deemed a court for removal purposes depending upon the particular actions
taken in each individual case); Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 128
F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (recognizing that the court could find an agency to be a court
depending on the specific circumstances and particular situation).
128 Johnston, supra note 79, at 451.
129
26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994).
One court within the Third Circuit has opined that the Sun Buick court did not accept the
130
functionalist approach. See DeLallo v. Teamsters Local Union #776, No. CIV.A. 94-3875, 1994
WL 423873 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994). It is worth noting that the DeLallo court stated that the Sun
Buick opinion contained an "unrelenting criticism" of the functionalist approach. Id. at *3.
However, this position may be overblown. The Sun Buick court merely states that it "questions"
whether the Supreme Court had in fact, adopted a functionalist test. Sun Buick, 26 F.3d at 1263.
The DeLallo court went on to proclaim that, "if squarely presented with the question, the Third
Circuit would refuse to apply the functional test." DeLallo, 1994 WL 423873 at *3.Again, this
does not comport with the facts. First, the Sun Buick court had the opportunity to reject the
functionalist approach expressly, but it declined to do so. Second, in the twenty years since the
Sun Buick decision, the Third Circuit has not taken the opportunity to reject, explain, or even
qualify its use of the functionalist analysis in Sun Buick. See Haggard, supra note 49, at 1854
(discussing the holding in DeLallo and the possible reasoning for the Third Circuit's decision).
131 Sun Buick, 26 F.3d at 1265-67. "In enumerating the ways in which the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles is unlike a court, it becomes clear that Floeter, Volkswagen, and Tool & Die are
distinguishable on their facts." Id. at 1266.
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looked at the entirety of the Board's powers and functions-"separately from
the nature of the proceedings before it.'

132

The analysis revealed what the court

considered a "dearth of judicial-type powers" and a lack of other court-like
characteristics.1 33 The court's examination convinced it that, overall, "the
Board's powers and duties makes it clear that its powers are those of the usual
type of administrative agency rather 3than
those of a court." 134 Other courts have
5
1
also embraced the global approach.
3. The "Federal-State Interests" Approach
Some courts that apply a functionalist approach also weigh the federal
interests against the state interests, often factoring those interests more heavily
than the agency's functions. 136 Although the origin of the functionalist
approach, Tool & Die, contained no consideration of competing federal and
state interests, later courts added this factor to their analysis. Starting with the
First Circuit decision in Volkswagen, some courts began to look not only at the
agency's powers, procedures, and functions, but also at the "respective state
and federal interests in the subject matter and in the provision of a forum."

37

In

fact, some have opined that this second prong of the functionalist approach is
the "more critical inquiry." 138
Similar to the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit incorporated a federalstate interests inquiry. 139 The Floetercourt recognized that the state maintained
'32 Id. at 1267.
113 Id. at 1266. "Not only does the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles have a dearth of judicialtype powers but its composition also has none of the characteristics of a court such as
disinterestedness, separation from the executive and learnedness in the law." Id.
114 Id. at 1265.
135 See Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla.
2002). First, the court acknowledged that the functionalist approach was valid, invoking
Shakespeare to accept that a court "by any other name" could still be a court in effect. Id. at
1282. Ultimately, the court found that the court held that whether an agency is a court "should be
determined at a higher level of generality than its role in the specific proceeding at issue."
Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
136 See Johnston, supra note 79, at 451-52.

Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972); see
also Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Volkswagen and
adopting the federal-state interest prong).
138 Ford Motor Co. v. McCullion, Nos. C2-88-142, C2-87-1459, 1989 WL 267215, at *3; see
137

also Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting
Rockville Harley-Davidson); Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.,
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting McCullion). It bears noting that the only
opinions to elevate the federal-state interest to the more critical prong have been from federal
district courts with no precedential value.
139 See Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1102 (quoting Volkswagen and adopting the federal-state interests
prong).
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an interest in "providing a 'convenient and expeditious tribunal to adjudicate
the rights and interests of parties to a labor dispute .... ,,140 Nevertheless, that
state interest was not sufficient to override the defendant's right of removal. 141
Courts can couple the federal-state interest with other sub-approaches. 142 For
example, a court might apply a dispute-specific analysis and find an agency to
be a court, but nonetheless find that the federal-state interest balancing militates
against removal.
The federal-state interest approach joins the dispute-specific and global
approaches as sub-approaches to the functional analysis that courts apply when
evaluating agencies for removal purposes. The basic tenets of the functionalist
approach-that the functions, powers, and procedures of an agency might make
it a de facto court for removal purposes-became, and remains, the
predominant approach. However, over roughly the last 15 years, rulings
advocating a different approach-a textualist approach-have started to chip
away at that dominance.
C. The TextualistApproach Emerges and Threatens Functionalist
Dominance

Contrary to the functionalist approach, some courts have declined to
inquire beyond the plain meaning attached to the statutory language of the
removal statute. This approach began in earnest 143 with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, ex rel. Richardson v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc. 144 The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industry

("BOLI") served "administrative charges alleging unlawful employment

140
141

Id. (quoting Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 262 N.W.2d 218,226 (Wis. 1978)).
Id. The court also noted that the state's interest in maintaining the specialized tribunal were

no greater than the interest they had in maintaining any of the state's regular courts. Id. Thus, one
could infer that the court felt that removal from the agency would have a substantially similar
effect as removal from any other traditional state court.
142
For example, the court in Floeterassessed the nature of the tribunal (globally) along with a
federal-state interest balancing. "We hold that the title given a state tribunal is not determinative;
it is necessary to evaluate the functions, powers, and procedures of the state tribunal and consider
those factors along with the respective state and federal interests in the subject matter and in the

provision of a forum." Id.
143

In an early case, Cal. Packing Corp. v. Int'l Longshoreman's & Warehouseman's Union

Local 142, 253 F. Supp. 597 (D. Haw. 1966), the Ninth Circuit also rejected the functionalist
approach and favored a textualist approach. The court found the Tool &Die reasoning "strained"
and looked to the plain meaning of the statutory language. Id. at 599. The reason this Note states
that the textualist approach did not start in earnest until the Ninth Circuit decision is because the
Cal. Packing Corp. decision was given in 1966 and had virtually no effect on the functionalist
approach's continued rise to dominance. Perhaps it was because courts felt more comfortable
relying on a circuit court decision, which in turn relied on two Supreme Court decisions, than a
lone district court decision.
144

288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002).
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discrimination" on U.S. West Communications, Inc. ("U.S. West") on behalf of
one of U.S. West's employees. 4 1 U.S. West, in arguing for removal, asked the
court to apply a functionalist test to BOLI and find the agency to be the
functional equivalent of a "state court" for purposes of removal. 146 The court
expressly rejected the functionalist approach. 147 The Richardson court opined
that courts adopting the functionalist approach incorrectly reached beyond the
statute's meaning. 148 According to the Ninth Circuit, the functionalist courts
had effectively "replace[d] the statutory term 'state court' with the phrase 'any
tribunal that acts as a court,' or 'any tribunal having court-like functions,' or
some substantially similar phrase."'149 Instead, the Ninth Circuit applied a
statutory construction analysis to the removal question. 150 At bottom, the court
posed one question: Is the statutory language of § 1441 unclear or ambiguous?
Finding that it was not, the court declined to analyze any further. 15'The Ninth
Circuit is not alone in this approach.
The Tenth Circuit also adopted the textualist approach in Porter Trust
v. Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Management DistrictNo. 1.152 In Porter

Trust, a group of landowners petitioned the county Board of Commissioners to
de-annex their land from the local sewer and water district; the water and sewer
district filed for removal to federal court. '13 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
federal district court ruling, which denied removal and remanded the case back
to the Board. 154 In doing so, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Richardson and found that reviewing the plain language of § 1441 using
"standard applications of the canons of statutory construction" was the better
approach.155 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Porter Trust court found that, despite

145

Id. at 415.

146

Id. at417.

Id. at 418-19 ("While we agree that the question of what constitutes a 'state court' under
the removal statute is a matter of federal, not state, law, we reject the 'functional test' analysis.
The functional test goes beyond the language of the statute, because the functional test is a
judicially-developed analysis that neither appears in, nor is necessarily implied by, the statutory
language. The settled law in this circuit, however, is that we do not go beyond clear and
consistent statutory language. Because the statutory language here is clear and consistent, we
may not go beyond it to adopt the functional test.").
147

148

Id. at419.

149

Id.

150

Id. at417.
Id. at418.
607 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2010).

1s1
152

153
114

Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.

"' Id. at 1254-55 (citing Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W.
Commc'ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002)). The court summarized by stating that, "[h]aving
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the Board's exercise of a judicial function, it was nonetheless not a "state
court" according to the plain language of § 1441.156 Thus, removal was
improper. 51 7 Other courts have also embraced the textualist approach.' 58
D. The CircuitsSplit and Betray Any Real Standard
Armed with the varying approaches outlined above, the battle lines

have been drawn-but not very clearly. On one side, stand the textualists, who
believe that the clear and unambiguous language of § 1441 requires them to
look no further. Essentially, if the state labels the tribunal a court, it is; if the

state does not label the tribunal a court, it is not. Among the textualists' ranks
are the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and a district court in the Sixth

Circuit. 159
Mustering on the other side of the battle line are the functionalists, who
believe that a plain language reading of the statutory language does not give
adequate effect to its meaning or intent. The functionalists believe that the
functions, powers, and procedures of the agency should determine whether it is,
in effect, a court-not simply the label assigned to it. Among the functionalists'
ranks are the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits, and two district courts from
within the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 160 Additionally, the functionalists gather
under what they believe is the authority of the Supreme Court. 161

determined that the appropriate test involves application of the plain language of § 1441(a) rather
than a functional test, we now apply that plain language to the facts of this case." Id. at 1255.
156

Id.

157 id.

158 See Smith v. Detroit Entm't, 919 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (echoing much of the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning from Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., and finding a literal statutory
construction approach to be more appropriate).
159

See, e.g., Porter Trust, 607 F.3d 1251 (adopting textualist approach); Or. Bureau of Labor

& Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (same);
Detroit Entm't, 919 F. Supp. 2d 883 (district court in the Sixth Circuit adopting the textualist
approach); see also supra Part III.C. This is not a claim that other courts have not adopted the
textualist approach; rather, these are merely the courts whose decisions this Note addresses and
uses as examples.
160
Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc. (Wirtz II), 224 F.3d 708, 713 (7th
Cir. 2000) (adopting the functionalist approach); Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d
1259 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38,
44 (1st Cir. 1972); Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280
(N.D. Fla. 2002) (same, by district court in the Eleventh Circuit); Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (same, by district court in the
Fifth Circuit); see also supra Parts III.A-B. This is not a claim that other courts have not adopted
the functionalist approach; rather, these are merely the courts whose decisions this Note
addresses and uses as examples.
161
Referring to the claims that Upshur Cnty. and Prentis established a functional test. See
supra Part III.A, notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
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This presents a large schism across the judiciary, with geographical
inconsistency and no standard. Defendants facing administrative agency actions
may or may not retain a right of removal based solely on whether the district
court in that agency's state embraces a functionalist or textualist approach. For
instance, a defendant facing a hearing in front of the Oregon Bureau of Labor
and Industry regarding a labor dispute would be denied access to a federal
forum. Simultaneously, that same defendant facing a hearing in front of the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, regarding the same type of labor
dispute, retains the right to remove the action to a federal forum. We end up
with the same defendant, presented with a substantially similar issue, in front of
two substantially similar agencies, but achieving substantially disparate results.
The split betrays any real standard.
Even courts that embrace the functionalist approach can yield disparate
results. 162 Two cases surrounding the Illinois Liquor Control Commission
("ILCC") expose the potential disparity. The ILCC is an Illinois state agency
authorized to control liquor licensing and registration, and to ensure that
suppliers act in accordance with the "good faith provision" of the Illinois Wine
and Spirits Industry Fair Dealing Act of 1999.163 In both cases, a distributor
filed a claim with the ILCC, alleging that their suppliers violated the Act; both
suppliers filed for removal on diversity grounds. 64 The two cases produced
65
opposing court decisions: one court found the ILCC
166 to be an agency;1 the
court.
a
of
equivalent
other court found it to be the
Although the Seventh Circuit later reversed the decision that found the
ILCC to be a court, 167 this shows the inconsistency and difficulty in applying
the functionalist approach. Thus, in a one-year span, three courts applied three
different analyses to the same agency, using identical prongs of the same test,

162

See Ford, supra note 75, at 342.

163 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/1 §§ 1-99 (2014); see R.J. Distrib. Co. v. Sutter Home Winery,
Inc., No. 99 C 3836, 1999 WL 571009, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1999); Wirtz Corp. v. United
Distillers and Vintners N. Am., Inc. (Wirtz 1), 69 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1064-65 (C.D. Ill. 1999),
rev'd by Wirtz 11, 224 F.3d 708.
'64
See R.J. Distrib. Co., 1999 WL 571009, at *1. The defendant also asserted a federal
question basis for removal jurisdiction, however, the court quickly dismissed that assertion. Id. at
*3; Wirtzl, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
165
R.J. Distrib. Co., 1999 WL 571009. The court hinged its determination on the ILCC's
inability to "provide full judicial relief," additionally the court applied a state's interest test. Id. at
*2.

166

Wirtz 1, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1063. The court reasoned that the ILLC's ability to order specific

performance pending the complete exhaustion of the appeal process was an "extraordinary"
ability "so severe that the ILCC's authority must be characterized as judicial power." Id. at 1068.
167
See Wirtz 11, 224 F.3d 708. The circuit court, looking at the first prong, analyzed the
"extraordinary powers" possessed by the LICC. Id. at 712. The circuit court applied an entirely
different perspective and found that, because no other court possessed those powers, the ILCC
could not be a court. Id. at 713-14.
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derived from the same controlling precedent within their own circuit and
reached different conclusions.
Conflicts from within the functionalist approach alone belie any real
standard. This clear split of authority and confusion among circuits should be
resolved by uniformly adopting a modified functionalist approach to determine
whether a state agency is effectively acting as a state court, because this
approach better evaluates the changing administrative landscape and preserves
the right of diverse defendants to seek removal to a federal forum.
Determining whether a state agency is a court for the purposes of
removal requires more predictability and consistency. Such a determination
requires a deeper understanding of the expanding scope and power of state
agencies, as wells as states' reliance on them to act as specialized courts.
IV. STATE WITHIN A STATE: THE BLURRED LINE BETWEEN
STATE AGENCIES AND STATE COURTS

[Administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch
of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal
theories much as the concept of
168 a fourth dimension unsettles
our three-dimensional thinking.
As we have seen, determining whether an agency is a defacto court for
removal purposes is a complicated endeavor. It has become complicated
because the administrative state has grown exponentially and its scope and
power have expanded; the administrative state has developed into a "fourth
branch" of government.' 69 States have blurred the lines distinguishing agencies
and courts-if not erased them altogether in some instances. So, how do we
decide: Is it an agency, or is it a court? In order to answer that question we must
look at the administrative agency, what it has become, and how it got there.
First, this Part reviews the expansion of state agencies, not just in their
sheer numbers, but also in their scope and power. Following that is a brief
description of the purported benefits to agency adjudication. Next, this Part
follows by looking at how state administrative agencies have become a state
within a state; often possessing, under one umbrella, the attributes of all three
branches of government. Last, this Part reveals how political influence and
potential abuse requires strengthening the right to remove from administrative
agencies to federal court. This Part will show how the modified functionalist
approach is best suited to determining whether a state agency is effectively
acting as a state court, because this approach better evaluates the changing
administrative landscape and preserves the right of diverse defendants to seek
removal to a federal forum.

168
169

FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
Id.
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Growth of the Administrative State and the Expansion ofAgency Scope
and Power

The administrative state has seen an exponential growth over the last
125 years. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 the
federal government started to expand the administrative state slowly; however,
that pace accelerated sharply during the New Deal era and has continued
unabated.170 In fact, the expansion of the administrative state is so prolific that
the federal government can only vaguely claim that there are "hundreds of
federal agencies and commissions,"' 7 1 leading some pundits to proclaim that
the government does not even know how many agencies it has. 7 2 State
governments, like the federal government, have emulated this expansion across
all fifty states; thus, state agencies and commissions vastly outnumber those at
the federal level. 7 3 While no clear count or exhaustive compilation of all the
various state agencies exists, they number into the thousands. 174
What has resulted from this massive expansion is that agency rules,
decisions, actions, and enforcements permeate virtually every area of our
private and business lives to one degree or another. In fact, one scholar
compared the influence and effect of administrative agencies as being as
common to our lives as electronics, "suburbs, and advertising." 175 While some

See Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce
Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885, 924 (1996) (noting that the federal
government created between eight and ten new agencies during the new deal, which doubled the
number from the previous decades since 1887).
171 See Federal Agencies & Commissions, WHITEHOuSE.GOv, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
our-government/federal-agencies-and-commissions (last visited Sept. 8, 2014).
See Josh Peterson, The Government Has No Idea How Many Agencies it Has,
172
170

(May 3, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/05/03/thePeterson claims that
government-has-no-idea-how-many-agencies-it-has/#ixzz2oPwI2UOA.
requests for a full agency list from the Government Accountability Office, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Congressional Budget Office were all fruitless. Id.
Additionally, the Performance.gov website, which the Government Performance and Results
Modernization Act of 2010 required to account for all the government agencies, was not
complete, even missing large agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission. Id. It
should be noted that as of this publication the FCC had been added to the list of agencies,
however, these updates may be a further indication that the government has not been able to
accurately assess the number and scope of all the federal agencies.
173 See Haggard, supra note 49, at 1833. "Exacerbating the issue, in the twentieth century,
states increasingly began to create agencies to regulate and to legislate in many more areas of
substantive law, presenting more opportunities for the federal removal statute to clash with
proceedings brought in state agencies." Id.
See FRANK E. COOPER, 1 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1965). Cooper used conservative
174
DAILYCALLER.COM

estimates and placed the number of agencies at over 2,000-in 1965. Id.
175
See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2004). Schuck
compared the commonality to VCR's rather than common electronics; however, although in
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of these agencies are very limited in their scope and power, the government has

imbued others with substantial reach and authority. For example, state agencies
can significantly affect individuals and businesses on a plethora of issues,
including settling labor disputes, 176 restricting property owners' ability to use
land, 177 licensing individuals in their chosen profession, 178 deciding medical
malpractice disputes, 179 and setting rates or prices,180 as well as a host of other
ways.
Although courts and scholars heavily debate the issue of whether the
right of removal should extend to administrative agencies, it is clear that since
the origins of the right, the reach of agency power and influence has grown
well beyond the scope imagined. 18' The states have delegated away the
authority to promulgate rules that have the force of law, enforce those rules,
and adjudicate based on those rules. The following Section discusses the
perceived benefits that might motivate a state to delegate this authority.
B. Claimed Benefits to Administrative Adjudication

Proponents cite a variety of benefits to having agencies make decisions
in lieu of courts.' 82 Among these reasons, two stand out as the most
predominant: the speed and cost of dealing with an agency rather than the court
system 18 3 and the potential benefits of utilizing agencies with perceived
expertise rather than general courts of law.' 84 However, achieving these

2004 VCR's were extremely common, they have since been replaced with more modem
technologies. Regardless, the point is still valid.
176
See, e.g., Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc.,
288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38
(1st Cir. 1972); Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't., 170 F. Supp.
945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
177
See, e.g., Heritage Enter. v. City of Corvallis, 708 P.2d 601 (Or. 1985) (en bane).
178
See Kolibash v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. Bar, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989)
(regarding state licensing of an attorney).
179
See, e.g., Wilson v. Gottlieb, 821 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D. Md. 2011).
180

See, e.g., Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).

See supra Part IV.A for a discussion on the expansion of agency scope and power; see also
Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1189-92
(1986) (discussing the expansion of federal agencies).
182
See Bernard Schwartz, The Administrative Agency in HistoricalPerspective, 36 IND. L.J.
263, 265 (1961). "The advantages of decision by administrative organs-directness, expedition,
freedom from the bonds of purely technical rules, and the consequent ability to give effect to the
181

legislatively expressed policy ....

Id.; Removal to Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 619-20

(discussing several purposes a state might wish to "jettison[] traditional notions of the judicial
process through the establishment of an administrative agency").
183
184

See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 270; Removal to Federal Courts,supra note 65, at 620.
See Removal to FederalCourts, supra note 65, at 619-20.
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benefits may only be possible by sacrificing safeguards built in to the
traditional court adjudication process. These judicial safeguards include, among
others, certainty and predictability based upon principles of stare decisis, the
use of well-established principles of law, and the "bridling of the individual
will of the magistrate by formalized rules of procedure."1 85 Furthermore, many
of these perceived benefits of administrative adjudication are of limited
importance when weighed against a defendant's right to removal.' 86 A brief
examination of the two most commonly cited benefits, cost and time savings
and agency expertise, will highlight some of their shortcomings.
1. Cost and Time Savings
Advocates of administrative justice saw the cost and delay normally
associated with traditional court proceedings as a problem that administrative
hearings would avoid. 187 Those advocates have long felt that justice through the
courts entailed formalistic procedures that cost litigants a significant amount of
time and money-often deterring them from pursuing their lawful rights. 188
The general idea is that an agency would be able to sidestep the formalistic
procedures and work with parties to find faster solutions through a more
informal system. 189 Proponents of agency adjudication claimed that many of
these adjudications would not require an attorney, costly discovery processes,
complicated trials, or other procedures and steps associated with traditional
adjudications. 190 Additionally, agency adjudication would be faster because of
crowded dockets and long times associated with traditional courts; thus,
defendants would save time and money. 191
2. Agency Expertise
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, proponents of administrative
justice point to the idea that members of an agency will develop expertise "as a
result of extensive experience with case law, statutes, and technical facts in a

See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 265.
See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the right of removal and the importance assigned to
that right by the Framers.
187
See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 268.
185

186

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. ("These difficulties, [long delay and high cost,] it has been claimed, are

191

avoided by vesting judicial power in administrative agencies instead of courts.").
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particular area. ' 192 Some theorize that this expertise allows legislatures the
freedom to delegate the difficult task of constructing specific standards and
remedies to relevant agencies.193 Such delegation also affords agencies a
certain amount of leeway in how they enforce their rules-a form of agency
discretion akin to prosecutorial discretion. 194 Further, some say this expertise
contributes to a speedier outcome because the agency can investigate claims;
gather and present evidence, some of which might normally be inadmissible in
a court of law; and provide their own remedy. 195
C. Abandoning the SeparationofPowers Doctrinefor Administrative
Agencies
Our tripartite system of governance consists of executive, legislative,
and judicial branches and is the basis of our federal government.' 96 The
doctrine of "separation of powers,"' 197 which is deeply rooted in our federalist
form of government, holds that the three branches of government should
remain distinct and independent from one another. 198 Additionally, this system
of government intends that these branches provide a system of checks and
balances against one another. 199 So necessary was this separation of powers to
the founding fathers, that James Madison proclaimed, "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny., 200 Those that want to discount
the dangers presented by softening the separation of powers doctrine may claim
that the agencies are just exercising "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial"

192

See Removal to Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 619; Comment, Removal of State

Administrative Proceedings to the Federal Courts, 12 STAN. L. REv. 492, 495-96 (1960)
[hereinafter Proceedingsto Federal Court].
193 See Removal to Federal Courts,supra note 65, at 619.
194
See id
195
196

See id. at 619-20.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and

Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592, 593-95 (1986); F. Scott
Boyd, Florida's ALds: Maintaining a Different Balance, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L.J. 175,

179-80 (2004).
197 Generally, Montesquieu is credited with presenting the idea of the separation of powers.
See Kurland, supra note 196, at 595.
198
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976). "The principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." Id.; see also Kurland, supra
note 196, at 593.
199 See Kurland, supra note 196, at 593.
20'

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2001).
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authority.2 °' Such a distinction is purely in name only; there is no such thing as
a "quasi-effect" on those that are regulated.0 2
However, the modem administrative state has obliterated the doctrine
of separation of powers in many cases. Federal and state legislatures have
consolidated executive, legislative, and judicial powers within the same
agency. 2°3 One author describes the all-encompassing nature of the FTC and
provides an example of the convergence of the tripartite powers. 204 In this
example, the agency promulgates rules relevant to their agency and its area of
authority.2 °5 Then, under this scenario, the agency then decides when and how
to make investigations, reports any findings to itself, and reviews the
investigation to decide whether enforcement is required; if enforcement is
required, the agency files a complaint, prosecutes the offender, and then
presides over that very adjudication.20 6 An agency board, commission, or
administrative law judge, depending upon the particular agency, conducts the
adjudications.20 7 If the agency does not like the outcome, they sometimes have
the option of appealing to a higher level within the same agency. 20 8
Some relaxation of the separation of powers doctrine is required in our
modem age. 20 9 The expansion of the administrative state was in direct response
to the perceived inability "of a simple tripartite form of government to deal

201

See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) ("Administrative agencies have

been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order
to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution.").
202 See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 273.
The constitutional purist may claim that this sort of authority exercised by the
administrator is, at most, only quasi-legislative in nature. Certainly, to soften a
legal term by a "quasi" is a time-honored lawyer's device. Yet, in this case, it
has become wholly illogical to grant the fact of the legislative power of the
commissions and still to deny the name. When the Supreme Court in 1952
upholds an indictment of a trucker for violation of a regulation promulgated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing certain compulsory safety
precautions for trucks transporting inflammables or explosives, perhaps the
ICC regulation is only a quasi-law. But when the trucker is convicted of
violating such regulations, we may be certain that they do not incarcerate him
in a quasi-cell.
Id.
203

See Lawson, supra note 1, at 1248. Although Lawson discusses the loss of separation of

powers in federal agencies, state agencies have emulated this trend. Id.
204 See id. Although the FTC is a federal agency, the description applies similarly to state
agencies imbued with the same tri-partite powers.
205

Id.

206

Id.

207

id.

208

Id.

209

See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 272.
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with modem problems." 1O° The practicalities of administering our ever more
complicated society required that agencies be able to regulate, and in order to
do so they must perform, to some extent, all three functions of government."'
Under a structure such as this, when the responsibilities and powers of all three
branches of government have been placed within one agency, that agency has
become a virtual state within the state, writing its own laws, executing and
enforcing those laws, and finally, judging those charged with violating those
laws. What is worse yet is that not only are they the judge in those
they often enforce their own regulations, they often
adjudications but, because
212
act as the plaintiff.
It is likely that the success of the administrative apparatus does
21
necessitate some combination of the tripartite powers. 13 However, that
necessity does not automatically dictate that other means of preventing the
potential tyranny caused by uniting the powers should be abandoned; on the
contrary, protections such as the right of removal should be strengthened in the
face of that potential tyranny.
D. Agencies v. Courts: Defining a Difference
If the functionalist approach is to prevail, as this Note advocates that it
should, it is going to have to gain some consistency. One of the ways to
accomplish this is through a more uniform agreement of what constitutes a
court for removal purposes.2 14 Courts look at these indicators differently and
assign them varying weights. This inconsistency allows for federal district
courts in the same district to hold that the same agency both is a court, and is
not a court, on different occasions. 2 5 The indicators or factors that courts use
vary, but several stand out as deserving significant weight and discussion.
First, courts have looked at the procedures employed by the agency
when adjudicating a dispute to see whether the agency emulated a court in the
way it actually handled the case. Procedures that courts found relevant were

210

JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1

(1938). Landis was a leading advisor to

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
211
See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 274.
212

See id. For example, a perceived violation of an environmental protection law may

motivate the state protective agency to enforce their regulations by issuing a citation and/or an
injunction. In this case, the agency is effectively the plaintiff in the same way the state would be
the plaintiff in a criminal case.
213
Id. at 272.
See id. at 275. Of course, achieving that consistency may require guidance from Congress
214
or the Supreme Court.
215
See supra Part III.D (discussing two Illinois district courts decisions in the same year
disagreeing about whether the ILCC, acting under factually identical circumstances, was a court
for removal purposes).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/14

32

Pizzo: A Court by Any Other Name: Preserving the Right of Diversity Remo

2014]

PRESER VING THE RIGHT OFDIVERSITY REMO VAL

how the agency handled pleadings,2 16 and discovery and pre-hearing
motions. 2 17 In addition, whether they allowed parties to "cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and present summation and argument" could factor into the court's
determination.2 8 Unfortunately, courts have provided no real indication as to
the weight any of these factors should command, thus, it is unknown what
combination of factors, if any, will tip the scales in favor of finding the agency
to be a court.
Second, courts have looked at the agency's power to enforce their
decisions. 219 For example, whether the agency has subpoena power,2 2 ° and
whether it may "provide 'declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or monetary
damages.', 221 In addition, one of the enforcement powers an agency can
possess is the ability to enforce its decisions without resorting to filing an
action in a traditional court.222 Like the procedural factors, courts have
provided little guidance as to the necessity or weight of any of these factors.
Lastly, courts look at the decision-maker factors: whether an agency
employs administrative law judges (ALJ)to adjudicate the dispute, the finality
of those decisions, and the independence of the ALJ are factors that the court
may weigh. 223 Originally, ALJs presided over agency hearings, but their rulings
were little more than advisory, with agencies retaining the ability to "amend the
ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law with relative ease., 22 4 The trend
has shifted, however, to systems that promote "finality in all matters heard by

216

See Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't., 170 F. Supp. 945,

950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (noting that the agency action procedures included a complaint, and
answer, and a hearing date set by the agency); see also Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (citing the agency practice of filing a
complaint but denying the defendant an opportunity to file an answer or conduct discovery).
217
See Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d 673,
677 (D. Md. 2002).
218
Id.; see also Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
219 See, e.g., Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (lst Cir.
1972) (stating that the lack of enforcement power supported concluding that the agency was not a
court); see also Rector, supra note 73, at 2286-87.
220
See Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (D. Md. 2005).
221
See Rector, supra note 73, at 2287 (quoting Rockville Harley Davidson, 217 F. Supp. 2d at
677).
222

See, e.g., Gottlieb, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (citing the inability to enforce subpoenas through

contempt and the reliance on a court to do so as an example of how the agency "does not exercise
traditional judicial powers"); Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (discussing
the commission's limited powers of enforcement of its decisions).
223
See, e.g., Ginn v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 829 F. Supp. 804, 806 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
224
James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central
Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards ofAgency Review, 54 ADM[N. L.
REV.1355, 1373 (2002).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

the ALJ,"225 either through statutory provisions, or by severely limiting agency
review of the ALJ's decision.2 26 Such finality buttresses the similarity that an
agency adjudication shares with a traditional court proceeding.22 7
Another trend that has emerged is the use of "central panels," which
are groups of "professional adjudicators who are administratively independent
of the agencies whose cases they hear, and thus, they are removed from agency
influence. 2 2 8 Starting with California in 1945, these central panels have gained
popularity with over 25 states embracing their use as of 2002.229 Central panels
come in several different configurations: independent executive branch
agencies; completely independent but within another agency for administrative
support; within a separate organization but assigning ALJ's to a particular
organization but
agency based on the judge's expertise; and, within a separate
23 °
basis.
rotating
a
on
agencies
various
to
assigning AL's
Of course, the central panel system provides advantages and
disadvantages. Among its advantages is the ALJ's independence to make their
decisions without the manifest or latent influence of the agency. Disadvantages
include the loss of expertise of the ALJ in the particular agency's field of
regulation, one of the perceived benefits of agency adjudication. 231
To summarize, many state agencies have come to emulate state courts
so closely that the net effect on a diverse defendant is effectively
indistinguishable. Additionally, the claimed benefits of agency adjudication
have proven illusory and the potential for bias against a diverse defendant is
significant. For these reasons, it is best to adopt a modified functionalist
approach to determine whether a state agency is effectively acting as a state
court, because this approach better evaluates the changing administrative
landscape and preserves the right of diverse defendants to seek removal to a
federal forum.
V.

DISFUNCTIONALIST: REWORKING THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH

Courts have had little problem identifying the characteristics of a
traditional court and identifying which of those characteristics they should
compare to determine the level of "courtness" an agency's adjudication
possesses. Unfortunately, courts vary on these characteristics' significance, or
even whether any of them must necessarily be present or absent to find for or

225

Id. at 1360.

226

See id. at 1359-61.

227

See Rector, supra note 73, at 2282.
See Flanagan, supranote 224, at 1356.

228
230

See id. at 1357-58.
See id. at 1356 (describing the four main configurations).

231

See supra Part IV.B.2.

229
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against removal.2 32 Some, such as the utilization of an ALJ whose decisions are
final, and an agency's ability to enforce those decisions, would intuitively seem
to indicate that the agency is effectively a court. 3 Others, such as pleadings,
discovery, and other procedural processes are less indicative. What is clear is
that the functionalist approach, although superior, requires guidelines that are
more concrete and a more rigid framework with which to evaluate whether an
agency is effectively acting as a state court for removal purposes. Ultimately,
any such guidelines or framework must keep the right of removal's core tenets
as its guiding principles; it should not become hung up on nomenclature or
labels. Adopting a modified functionalist approach is the fairest method to
evaluate the changing administrative landscape and preserve the right of
diverse defendants to seek removal to a federal forum. This Part looks at why
the functionalist approach is superior, how it can be modified for improvement,
and two potential criticisms. Section A discusses why the functionalist
approach is superior for protecting against political influence and subject matter
bias within agencies. Section B discusses how the textualists got it wrong and
suggests several ways to improve the functionalist approach. Section C
analyzes why the perceived benefits of agency adjudication are largely illusory
and Section D closes with a rebuttal of two potential criticisms.

A. The FunctionalistApproach Is the Best Approach To Protectthe Right
of Removal Against PoliticalInfluence and Subject MatterBias
State agencies are inherently political. Generally, states form agencies
through the legislative process or by gubernatorial fiat, and often those two
branches struggle over their control.235 Depending on the statutory structure,
politicians may retain some review power over agency
236 regulations, even having
the power to alter or disallow a proposed regulation. Usually, the state's

232

See, e.g., Ford, supra note 75, at 332 (discussing the various factors courts weigh and

whether a court must weigh any particular factors).
233
See, e.g., Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259 (3d. Cir. 1994) ("[A]n
administrative agency would not be considered a court if it did not have the 'power to accord
relief equivalent to that available from a court."' (citation omitted)); Tool & Die Makers Lodge
No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't., 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (noting "that the
[agency] lacks the power to enforce its own orders, an attribute whose presence or absence is
significant if not decisive on the question as to whether a tribunal is a court").
234
See Neal D. Woods, PoliticalInfluence on Agency Rule Making: Examining the Effects of
Legislative and GubernatorialRule Review Powers, 36 ST. & Loc. Gov'T REV. 174, 174 (Fall
2004). Gubernatorial fiat is the process whereby a state's Governor establishes an agency using
only his executive power, rather than establishing an agency through legislation.
235
See id.
236 See id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 117

Governor appoints agency heads to oversee various state agencies. 237 A
Governor presumably appoints an agency head that will champion that
Governor's agenda. This power of appointment should not be undervalued.
A politically based appointment assures the executive that the agency
will advance the executive's agenda; it is common for agency heads to be of the
same political party and ideology as the appointing executive. 238 This is
important in several respects. An agency will promulgate rules based upon that
agenda, which is subject to change with every executive term. An agency's
rules are subject to "drift," a term that describes slow, incremental movement
away from the originally perceived purpose or scope of the agency. 39 More
importantly though, is the concept of enforcement and remedial discretion
afforded to agencies. Mix this discretion with the fluid nature of an agency's
agenda, the abandonment of the separation of powers, and agency adjudication;
the result is a significant potential for unfair, arbitrary, and inconsistent
application of the law.
Another consideration is "subject matter bias" within an agency, which
this Note uses to denote a personal, ideological, or political interest in the
subject matter regulated by an agency. 240 Agency actors may have a subject
matter bias that motivates them to be more lax or more vigorous in the

237

See,

e.g.,

Appointments of State

Officials,

W.

VA.

SECRETARY

OF

STATE,

http://www.sos.wv.gov/PUBLIC-SERVICES/EXECRECORDS/APPOINTMENTS/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) ("The Governor is given the authority to make
appointments of four types, including executive agency heads, members of boards, commissions,
task forces and councils, positions authorized by the Legislature for specific reasons, and persons
to fill vacancies in certain federal, state, legislative and judicial offices.").
238
See David Miller, Efficiency and Environmentalism: The Case for Uniform Procedures
Acts in State Environmental Laws, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 435, 466 (2013)
("Governors... typically appoint members of their own political parties to agency head
positions. The reasons for this are obvious.... it is done to help ensure state agencies implement
and enforce policies consistent with the Governor's overall policy goals.").
239
See Jonathan R. Macey, OrganizationalDesign and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94, 98-99 (1992). Macey describes the phenomenon of
"bureaucratic drift and legislative (coalitional) drift," and some of their attendant consequences.
Id. at 94.
240
It is intuitive that some agencies will attract more people with a personal interest in the area
in which the agency operates. For example, a state environmental protection agency is more
likely to attract individuals who have an interest in the environment, or a labor relations board
may attract those with an interest in organized labor. While there may be nothing inherently
wrong with this, it still presents a fair possibility that such an individual will apply the agency
regulations in a biased way. See, e.g., RYAN BUBB & PATRICK L. WARREN, OPTIMAL AGENCY
BIAS
AND
REGULATORY
REVIEW
1,
2-3,
35-36
(2012),
available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/BubbPaperDec2012.pdf.pdf. (last visited Sept. 8, 2014)
(discussing the appointment of agents who are biased in favor of the agency mission or a
particular political agenda).
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enforcement and adjudication of the agency's regulations. 241 For example, an
agency representative who was formerly a member of a union, or who has
family members that are union members, is more likely to be sympathetic to
union causes or complaints. They may or may not investigate and prosecute
claims with a conscious bias favoring unions. Even if that bias is not conscious,
it is hard to argue that there would not be some unconscious bias to side with
the union over an employer. Similarly, an enforcement agent for a professional
licensing board might have a personal bias against an out-of-state individual or
corporation expanding into what that agent perceives as his territory. Perhaps
an administrative agent with a state environmental protection agency, who has
a bias against certain large corporations, might zealously hamper a proposed
land use application.
Lastly, agencies may be "susceptible to powerful local influences," and
industry interference. 24 ' For example, the Sun Buick court recognized that the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles was comprised of several new and used car
dealers and "persons who are likely to be partial toward dealers and their
industry., 243 In addition, the court in Wirtz noted that the Fair Dealing Act,
which was the basis of the agency's action, was "commonly referred to as 'The
Wirtz Law' because of plaintiffs active support of its passage." 2 "
Furthermore, an agency that serves one "clientele," such as a banking regulator,
may have a tendency to generate rules that are more favorable to that
clientele. 245 This influence adds to the possibility of bias against an out-of-state
defendant.
The inherently political nature of agency rulemaking, enforcement, and
adjudication, coupled with the possible subject matter bias among agency
representatives, local industry influences, and the dangers associated with
abandoning the separation of powers, presents the very real possibility of
bias-including bias against an out-of-state defendant. This significant

241
See, e.g., id.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., PoliticalControl Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 488-95
(1990) (discussing the potential for and impermissibility of political bias in agency functions).
Although both of these sources discuss federal agencies, this should translate accordingly to state
agencies. Additionally, it should be noted that bias could also be inherent in judges; however,
because of the specific subject matter that an agency handles, and the attraction of agency
personnel with a keen interest in that subject matter, it is fairly conceivable that the agency will
be more likely to be biased. When the combination of rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication
powers are exercised by an agency, this bias can be compounded and provides much more risk of
bias than the possibility of a federal judge alone being biased.
242 Ford, supra note 75, at 339.
243
Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994).
244
Wirtz II, 224 F.3d 708, 709 (7th Cir. 2000).
245
See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substanive for ProceduralReview of Guidance
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 390-92 (2011) (discussing agency influence by stakeholders,
i.e., the regulated industry, and shaping of rules).
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potential for bias militates in favor of a strengthening a diverse defendant's
right of removal from state agencies when they act as defacto courts.
B. The FunctionalistApproach Is Superior but Requires Some Reworking
This Note concludes that the functionalist approach is the superior
approach because it is more likely to preserve the rights of the defendant that
the removal statute is intended to protect. Despite this superiority, the
functionalist approach needs some improvements to adapt to the modem
administrative state and its effects. First, the federal-state interest approach
should be abandoned, because this standard does not test whether the purpose
of removal has been met. Second, the functionalist approach should be
bolstered by adding an important perspective to the evaluation-that of the
defendant's affected rights. Textualists are mistaken in their rigid application of
a plain-meaning only stance that disregards the underlying intent of the
removal statute, the increasingly judicial nature of the administrative state, and
the effect of agencies on defendant's rights.
1. The Federal-State Interest Approach Should Be Abandoned
Courts that engage in a federal-state interest approach 246 to evaluate the
propriety of removal disregard the intent of the removal statute. Removal is
proper under § 1441 as long as it is a "civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction., 247 The
form of original jurisdiction relevant to this Note is diversity jurisdiction,
pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code § 1332.248 In any civil case in
which the parties are diverse according to § 1332, and the amount in
controversy threshold is met, the removal statute provides that the defendant or
defendants may remove the case to federal court, thus it is a retained right of
the defendant. 249 No mention of weighing any state interests is present; in fact,
the right of diversity removal specifically means to protect out-of-state
defendants against an in-state bias. 250 This Note argues against the textualist
approach, which aims to define the word "court," but at least textualists argue
over a word that is actually present in the statute; federal-state interest
proponents insert a component that is completely absent from the statute.
If fear of bias by an in-state judge against an out-of-state defendant is
the core of the right of diversity removal, then surely the potential bias of an
246

See discussion supra Part III.B.3.

247

28 U.S.C. § 144 1(a) (2013).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2013).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added).
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the intentions behind the right of removal and

248
249
250

providing the full text of the statute).
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administrative agency should qualify an out-of-state defendant for the same
protection. State agencies are arguably subject to much more significant biases
than state court judges are. Agencies often stock their staffs with people who
have a personal interest in the subject matter that skews their judgment. 251 The
heads of many state agencies are political appointees, empowered to advance
the political agenda of the governor-an agenda that may not coincide with the
rights of an out-of-state defendant. Additionally, the agenda of an agency, the
decisions regarding which violations to prosecute, the penalties sought, and
to
other relevant factors are subject to change from administration
252
administration, which provides less stability and predictability.
Proponents of a federal-state interest balancing approach would have a
more plausible argument in the context of federal question jurisdiction; the
federal-state interests are not relevant in diversity jurisdiction.2 53 Agency
removal does not disrupt a state's interests in administering its laws and
providing a forum to hear parties any more than regular court removal disrupts
those interests. We quite regularly task federal courts with handling cases that
apply state law, which a state would seem to have an inherent interest in
applying. Those laws are not somehow less important to a state than an
agency's regulations. Federal judges capable of applying state law are capable
of applying state regulations. The concern that a court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction, hearing a dispute regarding a state regulation, is somehow
disrupting the state's ability to administer its laws seems irrational. Removal
merely assures that a defendant retains the right to have his case heard in a
presumptively neutral federal forum.
State and federal interests require no balancing under removal from
traditional state courts. In fact, the courts hold that states may not "impair the
right to remove a cause on diversity grounds when the removal is timely and
diversity does in fact exist" and that any attempt by a state statute to do so
would be unconstitutional.254 Thus, the defendant retains a right of removal
regardless of the state's interests. Defining the word "court," which is present

251
See discussion supra Part IV.B. (discussing the possibility of personal interest in the
agencies area of regulation and the attendant bias).
252 See, e.g., BUBB & WARREN, supra note 240, at 35-36 (discussing the appointment of agents
who are biased in favor of the agency mission or a particular political agenda).
253 The struggle between state and federal interests in federal question jurisdiction is more
legitimate than in diversity jurisdiction because in the former there is a balancing between a
state's sovereign right to regulate its own affairs under our federalist system and the necessity for
applying federal law consistently across states. On the other hand, diversity jurisdiction merely
contemplates the fair application of law, whether state or federal, regulatory or common, to an
out-of-state defendant.
Davila v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D.P.R. 1951). "The decisions
254
uniformly hold that it is beyond the power of the States to impair the right to remove a cause on
diversity grounds when the removal is timely and diversity does in fact exist. A statute which in
terms purported to effect such a result would be unconstitutional." Id. (citations omitted).
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in the statute, is one thing; but fabricating a state interest out of thin air is
another. For these reasons, courts should discard the federal-state interest
prong.
2.

Consideration of the Defendant's Affected Right Using a DueProcess Lens

What should become part of the functionalist approach is an analysis of
the effect that the agency's decision has on a defendant. In other words, what
does the defendant stand to lose if the agency action does not decide in his
favor? Because the right of removal is a right intended to benefit the defendant,
it is reasonable to analyze the decision to extend or retract that right, at least in
part, from the perspective of the defendant. An approach that looks solely to the
"functions, powers, and procedures of the state tribunal" 255 misses a valuable
consideration that lies at the heart of the right of removal-protecting the
defendant.
The right of removal assures that a defendant has an opportunity to
have his case heard in front of a federal court, which we presume to be free
from bias; such bias, it is believed, could lead to the unfair and unequal
application of the law. The result of that unfair or unequal application of the
law may be the violation of a defendant's substantive due process rights. "The
Due Process Clause includes a substantive component that 'bar[s] certain
[arbitrary wrongful] government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."' 256 A comprehensive definition of exactly
which rights are substantive due process rights is well beyond the scope of this
Note.
However, the Supreme Court has defined certain rights as requiring
due process. For example, the Court has invalidated "arbitrary and
unreasonable" government actions that adversely affect property rights, such as
certain zoning laws.257 Additionally, the Court has found that the rights to enter
into contracts, 258 and to earn a livelihood, 259 were beyond arbitrary government
255 Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979). This is the central
factor of the functionalist's approach to determining whether the agency is acting like a court.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
256
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REv. 519, 521 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
257 Id. at 533-34 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (citing
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928))).
258
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a law that limited the amount
of hours an employee and employer could agree to under their contract). Although Lochner has
been overturned, and the level of scrutiny used in these types of cases has been tempered, the
premise underlying the limitation of arbitrary govenrmnet interference in substantive economic
rights remains valid. See Levinson, supra note 256, at 525-26.
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interference. Thus, agency actions that have the power to limit or forbid a
defendant's use of his land, or deny a defendant the necessary license to pursue
his chosen profession, substantially affect a right that would normally be
subject to substantive due process protections.
Ultimately, whether a substantive due process prism is used, or some
other evaluative method, courts should include an analysis of the agency's
actions' effect on the defendant. Indeed, it is highly likely that a defendant's
only concern is to what extent the agency's action will negatively affect his
personal or business interests. In the context of diversity removal, the proper
measure is not the state's interests, but rather, the defendant's interests. A court
may best determine whether an agency is acting like a court by looking at how
that agency can affect the defendant. A person whose livelihood is destroyed,
or whose property becomes virtually worthless as a result of adjudication,
probably cares little about the label affixed to the entity that performed that
adjudication. Thus, modifying the functionalist approach to include an
examination of the defendant's affected rights will more fairly assist a court in
determining whether the state agency is effectively a state court.
3. The Textualists Got It Wrong
Textualist courts claim that agency removals merely present a question
of statutory construction and they have no authority to go beyond the plain
meaning of the statute. 260 This simplistic view, while easy to defend, summarily
discards any intentions that the text might not fully capture. The Volkswagen
court was correct when they gingerly broached the subject of agency removal
and proclaimed a functional evaluation was "far more satisfactory than to be
content with a Steinian rendering of 'a board is a board is a board.' ' 26 1 Even
those courts and pundits who claim that Upshur County did not adopt a
functionalist approach must concede that the Court went beyond a purely
textualist approach. Rather than sticking resolutely to the plain language, they
proceeded to analyze any administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial powers

See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (invalidating a state statute that
interfered with an individual's right "to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation"). Similar to Lochner, Allgeyer has
since been abrogated, but the underlying idea limiting arbitrary government action regarding
economic rights remains intact. See also Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock
Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House, 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884)
(Bradley, J., concurring) ("The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an
inalienable right ...").
260
See Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 288
259

F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 2002).
261 Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38,44 (1st Cir. 1972).
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exercised by the Upshur County court.262 The outcome does not belie the
approach they used to arrive at it.
Additionally, the reliance on a purely textualist approach appears to be
a selective one. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in Nationwide Investors v.
Miller,263 went beyond a purely textualist approach when it reviewed the
meaning of "civil action" in the context of federal officer removal pursuant to §
1442(a)(1). 2 64 There, the circuit court relied upon Supreme Court precedent
"endors[ing] a broad reading of § 1442 rather than 'a narrow, grudging
interpretation '26-a statement which itself could be interpreted to reject strict
textualism. The court also looked to precedent within its own circuit to define
whether the particular action at hand, a wage garnishment, was a civil action
according to the statute.266 The court ultimately used the precedent from that
case, which defined "civil action" in the context of the federal removal statute,
§ 1441, and applied the same reasoning to Miller, which implicated §
1442(a)(1).267 That precedent established that the court should broadly construe
the language of the statute-not apply a strict textualist argument.268 The court
then proceeded to discuss the underlying purpose of the statute and found that
the "form of the action is not controlling; it is the state's power to subject
federal officers to the state's process that § 1442(a)(1) curbs., 2 6 9 Thus, it
looked beyond the language and based its holding on the agency's power and
function.27 °
C. The Claimed Benefits ofAgency Adjudication Are Largely Illusory
Cost and time savings, along with agency expertise, are benefits that
proponents of administrative justice claimed would follow the expansion of
agency adjudication; however, these claims have proven to be both illusory and
not significant enough to override a defendant's right of removal. Agency
expertise in rulemaking and enforcement is a valid benefit, but agency expertise
may be overblown in the adjudicatory context for two reasons. First, federal
Upshur Cnty. v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 470-72 (1890).
793 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1986).
264 See id at 1045-46; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2013) (providing for removal to
federal court whenever the defendant is a federal officer or agent acting in their official capacity).
265 Miller, 793 F.2d at 1046 (quoting Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402,407 (1969)).
266 Id. at 1045 ("In Swanson v. Liberty National Insurance Co., 353 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir.
1965), we held that the characterization of a garnishment proceeding is a question of federal law
and that the Alaska proceeding in that dispute was a 'civil action' under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.").
262
263

267

Id.

268

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047 (citing Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406).
Id. at 1046 (describing the ability of the state to fine and imprison the defendant and the

269
270

state's coercive power).
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judges are often required to adjudicate cases where they have little or no
knowledge of the underlying subject matter. Second, very often the agencies
base their adjudications on traditional common-law concepts, not on some
specialized causes of action inherent only to the subject matter of their agency.
Society often asks judges to review cases that center on areas they
know very little about-including judicial review of agency adjudications. We
would not suggest that a federal court judge is incapable of evaluating a patent
claim on a highly complicated chemical compound or an intellectual property
claim regarding a highly technical computer program; this is a task regularly
undertaken every day in our federal courts. Yet, proponents of administrative
justice based on agency expertise assert that a regulation promulgated by a
Department of Transportation or a Labor Relations Board would overwhelm
these same judges. Such a tepid justification should not quash a defendant's
right to removal.
This is particularly true when we take into account the fact that many
of the agency disputes are, at base, no more than common law causes of action.
For example, the bulk of cases that comprise the circuit split on agency removal
are, at base, no more than common law causes of action. Many of these cases
were questions of collective bargaining agreements or labor agreements
regulated by federal law.2 71 Others involved contract disputes in regulated
industries, but retained at their core basic contract rights that would need to be
determined.27 2 Yet others involved adjudication of cases involving disputes of a
typical nature that appear in front of federal judges on a regular basis, such as
malpractice claims,273 age discrimination,274 and insurance
medical
misrepresentation.275 Such pedestrian causes of action and the attendant
interpretation of state laws certainly do not require expertise beyond the
capacity of a federal judge.
Additionally, reliance on such agency expertise may sometimes prove
unfruitful. As previously discussed, agencies may be subject to political
influence and subject matter bias that can consciously or unconsciously cloud

See, e.g., Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc.,
288 F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 2002); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454
F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972); Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't.,
170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
272
See, e.g., Wirtz II, 224 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2000) (dispute regarding the termination of a
liquor distribution contract in violation of state regulation); R.J. Distrib. Co. v. Sutter Home
Winery, Inc., No. 99C 3836, 1999 WL 571009 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1999) (same).
See, e.g., Wilson v. Gottlieb, 821 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D. Md. 2011) (claiming medical
273
malpractice by federal employee made the case removable under § 1442(a)(1)).
274
See, e.g., Ginn v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., 829 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (claiming
employment age discrimination in violation of state law).
275
See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2005)
(claiming misrepresentation in the sale of life insurance policy).
271
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their judgment.27 6 Couple this with the reduced or eliminated separation of
powers and the potential for unfair outcomes or abuse becomes significant.2 77

When a defendant can remove to a federal court, he succeeds in replacing the
agency and its representatives as the adjudicator, foiling any possibility of
engaging in unfair adjudication, whether conscious or not. Plenty of reasons
can support utilizing agency expertise when it comes to formulating regulations
and investigating claims; however, the reliance on agency expertise as

justification for the superiority of agency adjudications becomes more tenuous.
Ultimately, however, no reasons support that this supposed expertise should
override a defendant's right of removal.27 8
Similarly, cost and time savings do not necessarily result from agency
adjudication; on the contrary, for diverse defendants in particular agency
adjudication may cause higher costs and longer delays. Over the years,
committees and commissions reviewing the efficacy of the administrative state
have found that in actuality litigants have realized no such benefit. 279 Because
most litigants choose to engage legal representation when confronted with an
agency action, they are unlikely to see a major reduction in the cost of legal
fees. 280 This is particularly true when we account for the fact that the
administrative adjudication adds another layer, or multiple layers, 281 between
the initiation of an action and its ultimate terminus.2 82 Add to this the ancillary
costs associated with delays, such as lost revenues or the ability to practice a
chosen profession, and it becomes apparent that the time and cost benefits
See discussion supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.C for a discussion on the consequences of abandonment of the
separation of powers doctrine.
278
See Removal to FederalCourts, supra note 65, at 620 ("On the other hand, the fact that an
agency has some advantage over a court should not automatically defeat removal. While the right
to remove has been limited, and in some situations eliminated, Congress has always believed it
important enough to be retained in most cases."). But see Proceedings to Federal Courts, supra
note 192, at 496 ("A combination of these motives would seem to outweigh the need for diversity
jurisdiction.").
279
See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 270-72; Mashaw, supra note 1, at 411 (finding the
average wait time for a decision on a disability claim and 18 months to two years for an appeal to
the same agency).
280
A potentially valid point exists that the reduced formality and procedural rigor of an
administrative agency action may reduce the amount of work required for a litigant's attorney,
however, this is likely to be limited, particularly in agency actions that employ administrative law
judges and follow more court-like procedural and evidentiary rules.
281
As opposed to traditional court actions, where the suit originates in a state
court and the
defendant can remove at that point if it is proper. Under the agency adjudication model, the
defendant must navigate the full agency procedures before a traditional court hears his case. How
many layers may depend upon the amount of agency appeals are available before the
administrative remedies are exhausted and whether or not a defendant must exhaust all remedies
before they can present their action to a state court.
282 See Schwartz, supra note 182, at 272.
276

277
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alleged to accompany administrative justice are not nearly as promised. In fact,
the opposite may be true.283
Lastly, even if defendants on the whole could save some time and cost
by submitting to agency adjudication, this is not a significant enough benefit to
override an individual defendant's right to removal. The right of removal is a
long-standing right that Congress has repeatedly affirmed. Only a small number
of diverse defendant's will be able to exercise their right to removal. Thus, if an
agency's adjudication process is more cost and time effective, the vast majority
of defendants will still benefit; only diverse defendants who choose to remove
will lose that alleged benefit.
D. Two PotentialCriticisms
There are at least two primary concerns surrounding removal from state
agencies. Although, it is unlikely that these concerns are sure to materialize,
even if they did, these concerns should not override the valuable and longstanding right of removal. The first concern is that utilizing a functionalist
approach will encourage defendants to try and "game" the system by
a shot at removal," leading to "inevitable delays and
frivolously "tak[ing]
284
disruptions.,
This concern is overblown. First, it is no more likely than a gaming of
the system by states that may wish to insulate their agencies from removal to
federal court. States can accomplish this by statutorily requiring that an agency
exclusively handle a particular type of case that regular state courts
traditionally adjudicated. By calling the adjudicatory body a board,
commission, or whatever else, they can avoid the court label that would allow
removal. Additionally, concerns over delay should not override a defendant's
right to remove, particularly in light of the fact that agency action is often just
as slow or slower.2 85
The second main criticism that opponents of agency removal cite is
that allowing it will lead to a massive expansion of removal cases that will
overwhelm the federal courts.2 86 As one court noted, this could subject federal
courts to "unwarranted, and thus wasteful, expenditure" of their resources as

See id. at 271. This is particularly true for diverse defendants who would normally be
entitled to removal from a state court to federal court, but now, because the suit originates in a
state agency, have to defend themselves through the agency's multiple layers prior to appealing
to a state court from which they can then exercise their right to a federal forum.
Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283 (N.D. Fla.
284
2002); see also Haggard, supra note 49, at 1867-68 (discussing the concern and citing Bellsouth
Communications, Inc.).
See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
285
See Haggard, supra note 49, at 1868.
286
283
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they dealt with the "inevitable increase in removal notices that would result
from wide-spread adoption of the functional approach. 2 87
Again, this concern is overblown. No evidence is present to indicate
such a deluge will occur. Quite the contrary, the functionalist approach has
been the dominant approach and has remained in use for over 50 years. That
should be enough time to see just how many defendants will game the system
or whether such a claimed increase actually is inevitable. Diversity jurisdiction
will still only apply to a limited number of defendants, those that are diverse
and have over $75,000 involved in the controversy, thus the pool of potentially
removable cases is necessarily limited already. 88 Neither of these tenuous
concerns should trump the right of removal. Congress has established in § 1441
the right of removal as just that-a right. Courts should address logistical
concerns about crowded courts or bad actors gaming the system through means
other than quashing a defendant's right.
VI. CONCLUSION

The right of removal affords diverse defendants an opportunity to
remove their case from a potentially biased state court to a presumptively
neutral federal forum. The Founders recognized the necessity of this right, and
successive legislatures and courts have continued to recognize it for over two
centuries. It is an important right that should not be abrogated based on
nomenclature; courts should preserve its purpose and intent by extending it to
court-like agencies.
Today's society is a complicated one. States rely on agencies to handle
many areas of our personal and business lives, imbuing many of them with
significant authority. Agencies often operate in ways that are indistinguishable
from the operations of state courts. These agencies promulgate rules that have
the power of law, enforce these rules, and then judge those charged with
violating those rules. This concentration of power within one entity can be
dangerous to individuals and businesses-a concern that is at the heart of the
separation of powers doctrine. Furthermore, political influence, local interests,
and subject matter bias add to the chances that an agency might subject an outof-state defendant to unfair bias in the adjudication of his case. These factors
militate for applying the right of removal to agencies that act as defacto courts.
The modified functionalist approach provides the most appropriate
method for defining what exactly qualifies a state agency as a court while
keeping with the underlying intent and purpose of the right of removal. The
textualist approach employs a simplistic approach that disregards the intent of
the diversity removal statute-to protect diverse defendants from a biased
287

Johnson v. Albertson's LLC, No. 3:08CV236/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 3286988, at *2 (N.D.

Fla. Aug. 6, 2008).
288
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/14

46

Pizzo: A Court by Any Other Name: Preserving the Right of Diversity Remo

2014]

PRESER VING THE RIGHT OF DIVERSITY REMOVAL

adjudication-regardless of the label applied to the adjudicator. On the other
hand, the functionalist approach preserves that intent by looking at the way the
agency operates and how it can affect the defendant through its enforcement
and adjudicatory powers. Fine-tuning the functionalist approach by eliminating
the state interest inquiry, and concentrating on whether the agency will impact
the defendant's rights, will continue to ensure that the removal right's
underlying purpose is served.
Of course, guidance by Congress or the Supreme Court could provide
much needed clarity, but in lieu of that, courts should continue to apply a
functionalist approach that takes into account the effect of the agency's actions
on the defendant rather than any supposed state interests. Because, ultimately,
if an agency is going to affect a defendant in the same way, and to the same
extent, that a state court can affect him, that agency is a court. The split of
authority and confusion among circuits should be resolved by uniformly
adopting a modified functionalist approach to determine whether a state agency
is effectively acting as a state court, because this approach better evaluates the
changing administrative landscape and preserves the right of diverse defendants
to seek removal to a federal forum.
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